Desperate Cities: Eminent Domain and Economic Development in a PostKelo World
Abstract
Kelo v. City of New London unleashed an unprecedented legislative response when the Court upheld the use
of eminent domain for private economic development as consistent with the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. By exhibiting an extreme deference to the legislative branch and failing to consider the
current model of economic development, in which “desperate” cities have seen their economic bases
contract and have embarked on fervent urban revitalization campaigns as a result, the Kelo Court failed to
take into account the immense influence that large corporate interests wield in the legislature. This
influence is generally exercised to the detriment of the interests of the average citizen whose home or small
business is at risk of being seized on behalf of powerful private interests and in the name of economic
development. Unwittingly, Kelo has opened the doors for abuse of these average citizens.
Kelo saw its precursor in the infamous 1981 Poletown decision by the Michigan Supreme Court.
Poletown’s lessons and the Michigan Supreme Court’s subsequent reversal of it are instructive in a postKelo world. While balancing the interests of cities and states desperate to revitalize their tax bases and
those of the average citizen who are given very little recourse in Kelo and in many legislatures, this paper
advocates a new framework under which economic development takings may be analyzed.
This framework comprehends a process, mandated by either the courts or by the legislature in enabling
legislation, in which Social Capital Impact Assessments (SCIA) would be used to correct the imbalance of
power between large corporate interests and government, on the one hand, and the average citizen, on the
other. Successfully implemented under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Environmental
Impact Statements and Assessments, that mandate the study of federal agencies’ actions and their impact
on the environment, have revolutionized the influence of previously excluded environmental groups on
environmental policy by using the courts as a mechanism for enforcement. By implementing a process by
which governments must respond to questions relating to the social impact of proposals that contemplate
economic development takings and by providing opportunities for public comments, as in NEPA, the
legislative balance-of-power implications post-Kelo may be corrected.
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Desperate Cities: Eminent Domain and Economic Development in a Post-Kelo World
By Asmara Tekle Johnson1
I. Introduction
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London2 (hereinafter
Kelo), upholding a Connecticut statute3 and permitting the use of eminent domain for
private economic development as consistent with the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution,4 spurred a level of public outrage unseen in modern
times to prior rulings of the Court.5 As a result of this outrage, a flurry of proposed
state6 and federal7 legislation ensued in an effort to counteract the effects of the Court's
decision in Kelo.
1

The author is a Visiting Associate Professor of Law at Thurgood Marshall School of Law at Texas Southern
University. J.D., 2000, Cornell Law School; A.B. cum laude, 1995 Harvard College. The author would like to
thank the gracious assistance of Fabiola Cagigal-Acciarri, Tom Kleven, Walter Champion, Timothy Johnson,
J’Antae D. Hall, Richard Bender, Marcia Johnson, and Martin Levy.
2
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in which
Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Justice O’Connor authored a dissenting opinion in
which Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas joined. Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion, and
Justice Thomas filed a separate dissenting opinion.
3
The relevant Connecticut statute includes a “determination of policy” stating that the acquisition of land by
eminent domain for “the continued growth of business and industry,” or economic development, in Connecticut
is a “public use” in the “public interest.” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-186 et seq. (2006).
4
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that “Nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. art. V. The current test for whether the exercise of eminent domain
satisfies the “public use” portion of the Fifth Amendment is whether or not the exercise has a “public purpose.”
See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662-63; see also Fallbrook Irrigation Distr. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158-64 (1896).
The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected a strict interpretation of “public use,” or a definition that comprehends
the exercise of eminent domain only if the real property seized will be used by the public. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at
2633.
5
See Judy Coleman, The Powers of a Few, the Anger of the Many, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2005, at B2; see also
Timothy Egan, Rulings Sets Off Tug of War Over Private Property, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, at A12.
6
At last count, approximately 39 states had introduced legislation to limit the use of eminent domain for private
economic development in response to Kelo. See John M. Broder, States Curbing Right to Seize Private Homes,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at A1. For instance, in California alone, five constitutional amendments and six
proposed pieces of legislation have been put before the California Legislature to counter the Court’s decision in
Kelo. Id. In Texas, the legislature acted swiftly and banned the use of eminent domain on behalf of a private
party, except for certain uses. Id. Among these exceptions is the taking of land for a new stadium for the Dallas
Cowboys football team. Id. In addition, in Ohio, the legislature placed a one-year moratorium on all takings
soon after the Kelo ruling. See id.; see also Dennis Cauchon, States Eye Land Seizure Limits, USA TODAY, Feb.
20, 2006, at 1A (noting the one-year moratorium in Ohio); see generally Terry Pristin, Developers Can't Imagine
a World Without Eminent Domain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2006, at C5 (discussing different measures that states
have taken in response to Kelo and noting the opposition to the legislative groundswell from developers, some
lawmakers, and the real estate community).
7
As of November 30, 2005, legislation was passed by Congress and signed into law by the President that makes
appropriations for certain government agencies and provides that no funds shall be used for federal, state, or local
projects that seek to use the power of eminent domain for economic development that would primarily benefit
private parties. See Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of
Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-115, § 726, 119 Stat. 2396,
2494-2495 (2005). Furthermore, the U.S. House of Representatives recently passed H.R. 4128, a bill that
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Economic development in the context of eminent domain generally refers to the
government’s taking property and its transferring title to a private party with the
understanding that development of the property will yield public benefits, such as
increased tax revenue or additional employment opportunities.8 In upholding the use of
eminent domain for economic development, the Court also reasoned that economic
development satisfied the Fifth Amendment's "public purpose" test, so long as the
development is part of an “integrated”9 or “comprehensive redevelopment”10 plan that
will yield increased benefits to the community in the form of increased property tax, sales
tax revenue, and more employment opportunities.11
Kelo should be evaluated in light of two contemporary guideposts. The first
guidepost is the abiding economic reality of many “desperate” cities and states. Over the
past two decades, cities have seen their economic bases contract, resulting in a loss of
higher-income taxpayers and an increase in the number of lower-income residents who
have a higher demand for city services.12 Indeed, cities run on the “lifeblood” of
property and sales tax revenues.13
This reality was dramatically reflected in the Kelo case itself, as the city of New
London was generally thought of as an “economically distressed” city.14 City leaders in
New London were desperate to raise additional revenues, as the Federal Government had
closed the doors of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center in 1996, resulting in a loss of
over 1,500 jobs.15 In addition, New London’s unemployment rate was almost twice that
of Connecticut’s in 1998, prompting concern from civic and state leaders and spurring the
plan for the development of the Fort Trumbull area at issue in Kelo.16
Fort Trumbull is an area located on the waterfront of New London, a feature of its
location that had attracted Pfizer Inc. to build a $300 million research facility on land
adjacent to the neighborhood.17 It is estimated that the development and construction of

proposes to prevent states and their political subdivisions from receiving federal economic development funds
for two years if a court of competent jurisdiction rules that eminent domain has been used for economic
development. Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. § 2(b) (2005). The same
legislation also allows not only for individuals to sue local or federal government to enforce any provision of the
proposed law, but also for the awarding of attorney’s fees should a plaintiff prevail. Id. § 4(a), (c). It also
prevents the federal government from using eminent domain for economic development. Id. § 3. The proposed
law broadly defines economic development as, “taking private property, without the consent of the owner, and
conveying or leasing such property from one private person or entity to another private person or entity for
commercial enterprise carried on for profit, or to increase tax revenue, tax base, employment, or general
economic health . . . .” Id. § 8(1).
8
Rachel A. Lewis, Note, Strike That, Reverse It: County of Wayne v. Hathcock: Michigan Redefines
Implementing Economic Development Through Eminent Domain, 50 VILL. L. REV. 341, 342-43 (2005).
9
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2666-67.
10
Id. at 2668.
11
Id. at 2665.
12
MAUREEN KENNEDY & PAUL LEONARD, THE BROOKINGS INST., DEALING WITH NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE: A
ON
GENTRIFICATION
AND
POLICY
CHOICES
(2001),
PRIMER
http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/gentrification/gentrification.pdf.
13
Id.
14
Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 507 (Conn. 2004).
15
Kelo, 1125 S. Ct. at 2658.
16
Id. at 2658-59.
17
Id.
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the Pfizer facility has resulted in 2,000 additional and largely high-paying jobs to the
area.18
The other guidepost in the contemporary context in which Kelo should be
examined is the current phenomenon, dating from the 1990’s, of the revitalization of
many of the United States’s previously forgotten and decrepit inner cities and downtown
“Urban revitalization,” also known as “urban redevelopment” and
areas.19
“gentrification” is “the process of neighborhood change that results in the replacement
of lower income residents with higher income ones.”20
A new cadre of mayors and
other city leaders have placed attracting higher-income residents to the inner cities and
downtowns at the top of their municipal agendas, in an attempt to rejuvenate tax revenues
and neighborhoods, and ultimately to bring renewed life back to their downtowns areas,21
precisely for the reasons stated by the city of New London in Kelo. Municipal leaders’
efforts have been aided by the fact that many downtowns have a large number of
attractive features to future residents, including unique architecture, the availability of
land parcels along waterfronts, as in the Fort Trumbull area in Kelo, thriving cultural and
arts scenes, easy access to health care, universities, colleges, and jobs.22
This contemporary model of urban redevelopment is in direct contrast to the
model of the 1940’s, 1950’s, and 1960’s, when urban redevelopment was initiated and
Urban redevelopment efforts
pursued almost exclusively by the government.23
diminished in the 1970’s and 1980’s, only to be resurrected in the 1990’s through a new
model that involved public and private partnerships, with heavy emphasis on the private.
In the context of this contemporary model of eminent domain for economic
development, it is imperative that a new analytical framework be used to examine takings
for economic development. The framework posed by the Supreme Court in Kelo fails to
take into account the current wave of urban development and the effects that this
phenomenon is having on ordinary citizens24 who live in areas targeted for urban
redevelopment, but who lack the requisite political connections to prevent their home or
small business from being seized.
History belies the notion that powerful private
18

Id.; see also Ted Mann, Pfizer’s Fingerprints on Fort Trumbull Plan, THE DAY, Oct. 16, 2005, at A1. The
benefit to attracting high-paying jobs is the prospect of additional sales and income tax revenue to the city and
state governments.
19
Cities in which urban redevelopment is taking place at an accelerated rate include San Francisco, Boston,
Seattle, Chicago, Portland, Atlanta, Washington, D.C., Denver, Cleveland, and Detroit. See KENNEDY &
LEONARD, supra note 12, at 1; see also EUGENIE L. BIRCH, THE BROOKINGS INST., WHO LIVES DOWNTOWN 1
(2005), http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20051115_Birch.pdf, (stating that “during the 1990s, downtown
population grew by 10 percent, a marked resurgence following 20 years of overall decline.”).
20
See KENNEDY & LEONARD, supra note 12, at 1.
21
Id.
22
See BIRCH, supra note 19, at 1.
23
At its inception, urban renewal was heavily pursued by mayors of cities who wished to compete with the
suburbs and to revitalize the inner cities. In order to achieve this goal, mayors sought funding for their initiatives
from the federal government. Business coalitions took a direct hand in helping mayors push legislation through
Congress, each time requiring more and more federal funds. Over time the funding for renewal projects came
not from federal funds, but from private interests as these interests realized the potential for profit of their
investments. BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN, INC. HOW AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES
22-33 (1990).
24
For purposes of this article, reference to the “average citizen,” “average resident,” or “average American” is
not exclusive of persons in the United States having United States citizenship or permanent residency in the
United States, but inclusive of landowners living and owning real property in the United States, whether for their
home, business, or investment purposes, regardless of their citizenship or residency status.
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interests often dictate the terms of economic development and, ultimately, the use of
eminent domain for revitalization projects.
Accordingly, this paper will advocate for a new framework that empowers the
average homeowner or small business owner who may face eminent domain as part of an
economic development project, but who lacks the political power to influence or to halt
such an undertaking. Part II of this article will examine the Kelo opinion. Part III will
explore the inequities in power between large primarily corporate interests and average
citizens in economic development takings and the attendant economic and political
subsidies in favor of large corporate interests at the expense of the average home and
small business owner, using Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit25 as a
backdrop to this study.
Part IV of this article will investigate reasons for a new
analytical framework using contemporary and past examples of economic development
takings, introduce this new schema, and propose additional solutions that may benefit the
average citizen landowner, large private interests, and government. Part V will conclude
this paper.

II. A Critical Look at the Main Tenets of Kelo
Kelo has radically changed the landscape of eminent domain law, by upholding
general economic development as a “public use” under the Fifth Amendment, though that
development may benefit private parties directly, notwithstanding public benefits of
increased tax revenues and more jobs. In Kelo, the Supreme Court majority relied
heavily on Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff26 and Berman v. Parker.27 In Midkiff, the
Supreme Court upheld as consistent with the Public Use Clause, a state statute
authorizing eminent domain for the transfer of title to real property from owners to
renters as a way to break up the oligarchic concentration of land ownership in Hawaii and
to infuse normal market conditions in the real estate market in Hawaii. In Berman, the
Court similarly approved a law as constitutional under the “public use” provision of the
Fifth Amendment that authorized Congress to use eminent domain and give land to
private developers because of a “balanced, integrated [redevelopment] plan”28 that
existed to clear the targeted area of slums and blight. In Congress’ estimation, there was
a threat to the “public health, safety, and morals”29 of the residents as a result of the
substandard housing and lack of adequate sanitation facilities, such as running water and
indoor toilets.
In the majority opinion of Kelo, Justice Stevens noted that there is a single
overarching requirement for an economic development taking to pass muster under the
Fifth Amendment: the requirement of an “integrated,”30 “comprehensive,”31 or “carefully

25

304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
467 U.S. 229 (1984).
27
348 U.S. 26 (1954).
28
Id. at 34.
29
Id. at 28.
30
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667.
31
Id. at 2668.
26
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considered”32 economic development plan. Although the Court first made several
references to this “balanced, integrated plan”33 requirement in Berman, it appears,
however, that the Kelo Court has established this factor as the premier requisite for an
economic development taking to be constitutional by its consistent mention of this type
of plan throughout the opinion.34 Moreover, although in Berman, the Court attempted to
outline the contours of a “balanced, integrated plan” by noting that it would have to
include “new homes, schools, churches, parks, streets, and shopping centers,” in the hope
that the plan would halt the “cycle of decay” of slum-ridden neighborhoods, the Kelo
Court failed to allude to or to require such specific qualifications.35 Indeed, without
defining any terms, the most specific delineation of an integrated or comprehensive
development plan that Kelo gives is one that will “provide appreciable benefits to the
community,” such as additional jobs and tax revenue, as well as the hope that a city’s
plan will “coordinate a variety of commercial, residential, and recreational uses of
land,”36 such that the plan “will form a whole greater than the sum of its parts.”37 In
addition, the Court specifically declined to review the effectiveness of the economic
development plan put forward by the city of New London.38
Outside of an almost exact replica of the economic plan for the Fort Trumbull
neighborhood in Kelo, little guidance and detail are provided to municipal and state
leaders and legal departments of these institutions, developers, real estate professionals,
and large private interests, regarding what would constitute a constitutional economic
development plan that includes takings. Furthermore, this lack of clarity not only
provides little comfort to ordinary citizens whose property may be subject to takings,
however amorphous or ineffective the plan may be, but also the opaqueness of Kelo
opinion, with respect to constitutional criteria for an economic development plan, opens
up the door wide to abuse of citizens.
A second noteworthy element of the Kelo decision is that the Court re-affirmed
the Court’s precedent, from Midkiff, that the standard of review for takings statutes is
rational basis.39 The rational basis test involves the courts’ examining whether the State
is using a rational means to achieve a legitimate purpose.40 Indeed, Justice Kennedy
noted in his concurrence to Kelo that reviewing these cases on a case-by-case basis,
rational review is likely the only basis on which the Court should review the majority of
takings statutes, outside of an examination by the Court to determine whether a taking is
“intended to favor a particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public
benefits.”41
32

Id. at 2661.
Berman, 348 U.S. at 34-35; see also Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2666 n.13 (referencing the “balanced, and integrated”
plan in Berman).
34
See infra notes 35-36; see also generally Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665-68.
35
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665-68.
36
The development plan included seven parcels of land, each of which was to be designated for a conference
hotel that was to be located at the center of restaurants and shopping, a recreational and commercial marina, a
riverwalk, residences, office space, support facilities for the nearby state park, the marina, and shopping,
respectively. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2559.
37
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665.
38
Id. at 2668.
39
See id. at 2667.
40
Id. (citing Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242).
41
Id. at 2669. Justice Kennedy, however, also noted that there may be some instances in which eminent domain
has been used to promote economic development in which a heightened standard of review is warranted, but he
33
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By far however, the most important element of Kelo is the Court’s express and
extreme deference to state and federal legislatures on the issue of whether or not eminent
domain should be used for purposes of economic development. Indeed, the Court
underscored the legislative deference exhibited by Berman by leaving to the legislative
branch questions of what and how much land should be included in an economic
redevelopment plan, including where the boundaries should lie for a project, and whether
or not a plan is actually effective in practice.42 The Court seemingly empathized with
those experiencing the “hardship”43 of eminent domain by counseling them to avail
themselves of the legislative process. Practically however, the Court’s advice amounted
to suggesting that concerned citizens lobby state legislative representatives for laws that
would restrict a state’s authorization of eminent domain power for economic
development.44
A. A Line in the Sand - What the Kelo Majority Opinion Refused to Do
Justice Stevens’ majority opinion in Kelo explicitly rejected three arguments
advanced by the Petitioners in support of their contention that the Connecticut law at
issue in Kelo was unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment. First, the Petitioners
argued for a bright-line rule that would “stop a city from transferring Citizen A’s property
to Citizen B for the sole reason that Citizen B will put the property to a more productive
use and thus pay more taxes.”45 The Court specifically declined to declare such a rule,
noting that it would artificially restrict what governments can and cannot do under the
Public Use Clause.46
Secondly, the Court refused to evaluate the economic development plan under
which eminent domain was exercised by the city of New London, both for its proposed
effectiveness in securing the public benefits of higher tax revenue, increased jobs, and for
New London’s determinations regarding the lands needed for the plan.47 In connection
with this argument, the Court, as a third matter, explicitly rejected the Petitioners’ request
to review Connecticut’s judgment of the need for a plan of economic revitalization to
declined to specify those instances. Id. at 2670. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence only reinforces the problems in
the majority opinion, especially with respect to the amount of influence large private interests may have on a
particular economic development project. See infra Parts III.A.-B. notes 66-80.
42
See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668 (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 35-36 “It is not for the courts to oversee the choice of
the boundary line nor to sit in review on the size of a particular project area. Once the question of the public
purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a
particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.”).
43
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668.
44
See id. (“We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its
exercise of the takings power. Indeed, many States already impose “public use” requirements that are stricter
than the federal baseline. Some of these requirements have been established as a matter of state constitutional
law, while others are expressed in state eminent domain statutes that carefully limit the grounds upon which
takings may be exercised.”); see also Elizabeth F. Gallagher, Note, Breaking New Ground: Using Eminent
Domain for Economic Development, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837, 1867-70 (2005) (discussing that “[w]hen
landowners are unhappy with the land use decisions being made by the legislature on their behalf, they are free to
elect new representatives or to vote with their feet by moving to a new locality with land use laws that they
prefer.”).
45
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2666-67.
46
See id.
47
See id. at 2668.
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satisfy certain public needs for the city of New London.48 The Court reasoned that
precedent, dating from Berman, bound it to respect the decisions of the legislative branch
of Connecticut.49
B. The Kelo Dissent
Although the majority relied on Midkiff and Berman as the underpinnings of the
its decision, Justice O’Connor’s dissent distinguished these cases by noting that the land
taken in them, albeit transferred to private hands, was mitigated by the takings’ directly
resulting in a benefit to the public.50 In Midkiff, the direct benefit to the public was the
dismantling of an oligarchic system of land ownership that resulted in a skewed real
property market in Hawaii. Similarly, in Berman, the takings directly benefited the
public by clearing an area of slums in Washington, D.C. that in its entirety was a menace
to public health and safety. In contrast, in Kelo, there was no equivalent “social harm.”51
In contrast, Justice Stevens’ majority opinion countered that precedent did not
mandate that the taking result in a direct benefit to the public, but that there be some
benefit to the public, even if the land acquired by a taking may be transferred to private
hands. The majority opinion essentially upheld a more attenuated, if not ethereal or
theoretical, notion of public benefit. For instance, in Kelo, the takings did not result in
any direct benefit to the community, as the homes themselves were well-maintained and
there was no oligarchy of land ownership. Instead the plan itself, once developed, was
pregnant with the hope that increased revenues, jobs, and momentum for the city of New
London would result in an indirect public benefit. The majority, thus, upheld the hope of
indirect public benefits.
Moreover, Justice O’Connor identified three categories of takings that the Court
has stated historically conformed to the requirements of the Public Use Clause. The first
category is one in which the government may convey private property that it has acquired
through eminent domain to “public ownership” for “a road, a hospital, or a military
base.”52 The second category includes the government’s transferring private property
acquired through a taking to private parties, “often common carriers, who make the
property available for the public’s use-such as with a railroad, a public utility, or a
stadium.”53 The third category that Justice O’Connor outlined includes those instances,
existing under “certain circumstances” and meeting “certain exigencies,” for which
“public ownership” under category one and “use-by-the-public” under category two, are
48

See id. at 2664.
See id. at 2668.
50
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674.
51
Id. at 2675. In response, the majority opinion of Kelo noted that Justice O’Connor’s dissent confused the
“purpose of a taking with its mechanics.” Id. at 2666 n.16. The majority opinion observed that Justice O’Conner,
in her dissent, failed to follow precedent by interpreting the notion that there had to be a social harm before
property could be taken and transferred to a private party. Instead, the majority countered that it is “future use”
of a taking that is relevant to the public purpose test, and that just because the mechanics of a situation entail a
private party securing title to land, a public purpose may still be achieved, presumably in the form of increased
tax revenues and jobs. See id.
52
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (emphasis added); see also Lewis, supra note 8, at 364-70 (identifying three
categories of “public use”).
53
Id. (emphasis added).
49
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unworkable under the Public Use Clause.54 According to Justice O’Connor, until Kelo,
only Berman and Midkiff had met the requirements of this third category because the precondemnation uses of the targeted land in those cases were ones that resulted in
“affirmative harm on society.”55
In comparison, Justice Thomas, in his dissent, went several steps further by
advocating for a return to a strict interpretation of the Public Use Clause in vogue in some
states at the nation’s founding. This strict interpretation is one in which the government
may take private property only if it will use it, or if the public has a legal right to use the
land.56 Justice Thomas also wrote that the Kelo Court has expanded the Public Use
Clause to such an extent by sanctioning economic development as a proper public use,
that it has effectively eviscerated the Clause.57
In analyzing the majority opinion, Justice Thomas reiterated the criticism that the
majority has created an illusory test that essentially ignores the motive for the economic
development. Reflecting the concerns that the Michigan Supreme Court noted in County
of Wayne v. Hathcock,58 in which it clairvoyantly disavowed the reasoning set forth by
the majority in Kelo, Justice Thomas wrote that, in the sphere of economic development,
private and tangential public benefit are fused and “mutually reinforcing.”59 Regardless
of the motive behind an economic development taking, it would be difficult to
“disaggregate” Pfizer’s or the developer’s private economic benefit from any promised
public benefits of increases in jobs or tax revenues.60
A second limitation that Justice Thomas found in the majority opinion is that
governments’ choosing to use eminent domain for economic development will put it in
the business of “upgrading” real property. Under Kelo, government now has additional
incentives to take property on behalf of private owners who intend to put it to more
profitable use, not only for the landowner herself, but also for the state. As the
landowner’s profit increases, this profit may be passed along to the state in the form of
higher property, sales, and income tax revenue.61
Finally, Justice Thomas admonished the majority for failing to intervene
judicially in the Kelo holding because the decision ultimately rests on the backs of those
least able to put their property to those uses that would yield the greatest economic
benefits to the government and who are least politically connected.62 Sadly, America’s
history illustrates that more often than not when eminent domain has been used to redevelop communities, the “leasts” in society are predominantly lower-income, racial
minorities, and the elderly.63

54

Id.
Id. at 2673-74.
56
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2679; see also id. at 2681-83.
57
Id. at 2678 (discussing that “[i]f such ‘economic development’ takings are for a ‘public use,’ any taking is, and
the Court has erased the Public Use Clause from our Constitution.”).
58
684 N.W. 2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004).
59
Id. at 2676.
60
Id.
61
Id. (noting that “[n]othing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home
with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.”).
62
Id. at 2686-87.
63
Id. at 2787; see also generally Wendell H. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the
Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L.& POL’Y REV. 1 (2003); Berliner, infra note 127, at 185.
55
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III. Advantage: Corporations, Kelo Analyzed and Applied to Current Economic

Development Takings
This paper finds the arguments advanced by the Kelo dissent ultimately more
convincing, more grounded in reality, and, ultimately, more just. The majority’s refusal
to hold in favor of the Petitioners, really stand-ins for the average citizen, and instead rely
on the effete and unrealistic notion that state legislatures, often composed of
representatives elected and supported, in no small part, from donations made by large and
powerful corporate interests, reflects a view of American democracy that is woefully outof-step with current realities of the legislative process in many states.64 This view is
particularly outdated, given the two important guideposts influencing the contemporary
urban planning environment:65 1) “desperate” cities that are in dire need, or believe they
are in great need, of additional tax revenues that make up the lifeblood of their
communities; and 2) the current explosion of “Downtown, Inc.,” or the strategy of
securing additional tax revenues by attracting higher-income individuals to live, work,
and play in previously neglected, but culturally and historically rich inner-city cores. The
effect is to displace lower-income residents who can no longer afford to live in these
redeveloped areas.
A. Extreme Influence
In the context of this model of urban redevelopment, it is often large corporate
interests with powerful political connections that are the largely “unmistakable guiding
and sustaining hand, indeed controlling hand”66 behind the government’s use of eminent
domain for economic development. There are several reasons for this line of thought.
First, “desperate” cities, those such as New London in Kelo that face an economic
drain, ironically enough do not have the leverage to negotiate terms of these economic
development projects that would preserve long-standing communities or small
businesses. Cities’ and states’ negotiating leverage is diminished markedly in the face of
a corporate threat, veiled or unveiled, to locate its development and attendant promises of
increased real estate, sales, and income tax revenue and jobs to a more accommodating
locale.
Second, this “desperate” environment in which many governments find
themselves, combined with the revitalization explosion of many of America’s inner
cities, puts the advantage decidedly in the court of large corporations or other large
private interests.
In addition, the notion of a powerful “sustaining hand” of large corporate interests
at the local or state level is grounded in American political theory.67 This theory
indicates that there is an inverse relationship between the size of the unit of the
64

See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 44, at 1868 (supporting the notion that the legislature is the primary forum for
economic development takings and that should landowners disagree with takings laws “they are free to elect new
representatives or to vote with their feet by moving to a new locality with land use laws that they prefer.”).
65
See Part I., supra notes 12-22.
66
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 468 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
67
See Laura Mansnerus, Note, Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial Review in Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 409, 432 (1983).
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government and the risk of the abuse of power.68 As the government unit decreases in
size, the risk of abuse of power increases.69 For this reason, several courts and
commentators have called for the abolition of the doctrine of separation of powers with
respect to land use decisions by municipalities.70

B. Increased Risk of Abuse of Power
Several arguments have been advanced in support of the idea that there is an
increased risk of abuse of power at the local level.71 One contention is that municipal
development corporations, such as the New London Development Corporation that was
the condemning authority in Kelo, lack objectivity because they invest substantial “time,
expertise, and money in designing public projects.”72 There is a vested interest on the
part of these economic development corporations for the drawn-up plans to succeed.
Furthermore, outside of the judicial system, there is generally no authority that
impartially reviews the plans and decisions of municipal development corporations.73 A
second contention is that at a more basic level, precisely because of the “desperate”
situation in which local officials often find themselves, they are simply more susceptible
to large-scale private interests and their associates, such as large corporations, developers,
and real estate interests, who overpower local officials.74
Additionally, at the state levels, cities and the “sustaining hand” of large corporate
interests that curry more political favor with state legislators often seek eminent domain
friendly statutes that favor the use of economic development takings to the exclusion of,
and at the expense of, the average citizen and taxpayer. An economic view of the law
bears out this theory. Judge Posner75 explains this behavior by noting that all people “in
all of their activities” are “rational maximizers of their satisfactions, including the
“legislator deciding whether to vote for or against a bill.”76 The public interest seldom
motivates legislators, but their desire to be elected or re-elected does.77 Money is often
68

Id.
Id.
70
Id. at 433 (citing Fasano v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973)), overruled on other grounds, Neuberger
v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d 722 (Or. 1980), that overruled a zoning board’s decision to approve a developer’s
plan to rezone an area because “zoning decisions by local governing boards” are not “legislative acts . . . to be
shielded from less than constitutional scrutiny by the theory of separation of powers,” and equating a taking to be
“quasi-judicial in nature” that “militates against a presumption of validity when a court hears a judicial
challenge.”).
71
Id.
72
Id. at 434.
73
Id.
74
See id. at 435.
75
Judge Richard A. Posner sits on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and he has written a
number of books and authored countless law review articles. In Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas
Pension Fun v. Lady Baltimore Foods, 960 F.2d 1339 (1992), Judge Posner, writing for the majority regarding
tax legislation, similarly noted that “[m]uch modern legislation involves targeting government largesse on
politically influential groups and the burdens of government on politically impotent ones. Not infrequently the
legislation benefits a tiny handful of individuals or firms or even a single firm . . . .”
76
RICHARD POSNER, PROBLEMS WITH JURISPRUDENCE 353 (1990).
77
Id. at 354.
69
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the most necessary tool for pursuing a campaign that will secure the election or reelection of legislators, money that is “more likely” to come from “well-organized groups
than from unorganized individuals.”78
Judge Posner further elaborates by stating that:
The rational individual knows that his contribution
is unlikely to make a difference; for this reason
and also because voters in most elections are
voting for candidates rather than policies, which
further weakens the link between casting one’s
vote and obtaining one’s preferred policy, the
rational individual will have little incentive to
invest time and effort in deciding whom to vote
for. Only an organized group of individuals (or
firms or other organizations-but these are conduits
for individuals) will be able to overcome the
informational and free-rider problems that plague
collective action. But such a group will not
organize and act effectively unless its members
have much to gain or much to lose from specific
policies, as tobacco farmers, for example, have
much to gain from federal subsidies from growing
tobacco and much to lose from the withdrawal of
those subsidies. The basic tactic of an interest
group is to trade the votes of its members and its
financial support to candidates in exchange for an
implied promise of favorable legislation.79
Posner would reason that most plaintiffs who seek to defeat economic development
takings are individual homeowners, such as the nine petitioners in Kelo and the members
of the Poletown Neighborhood Council in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of
Detroit.80
Sadly, these groups that must stand against city and corporate giants are often too
small and have too little time before a plan or action is taken to seize their property to
organize effectively.81 Moreover, the impetus to organize is even further destroyed when
78
POSNER, supra note 76, at 354; see also Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown: County of Wayne v. Hathcock,
Economic Development Takings, and the Future of Public Use, MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005, 1016 (2004) (stating
that “[l]ittle prevents municipalities and private interests from abusing the system. Both corporate interests and
political leaders dependent on their support have tremendous incentives to overestimate the economic benefits of
projects furthered by condemnation.”) (emphasis added).
79
POSNER, supra note 76, at 354; see also Somin, supra note 78, at 1015 (noting that there is an “unjustified
faith” in the political process and emphasizing that the process currently justifies less deference by the courts);
see also Ilya Somin, Posner’s Democratic Pragmatism, 16 CRITICAL REV. 1 (2004) (echoing Posner’s arguments
regarding how interest groups are able to take advantage of the political process, and arguing for increased
judicial review).
80
304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (upholding a Michigan quick-take statute that allowed the city of Detroit to take
land in the Poletown neighborhood and to transfer it to General Motors for the construction of a Cadillac auto
plant because the public benefits promised by the plant were substantial); see also Part III.D., infra notes 89-114.
81
But see Gallagher, supra note 44, at 1868 (refuting the notion that landowners may organize effectively
because economic development projects often involve the assembling numerous parcels of land, owned by
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one considers that some landowners may support the economic development because of
the economic gains to themselves individually. For instance, the Poletown Neighborhood
Council suffered from this fate--it failed to unite the Polish-American community in
Detroit because many residents believed that they would benefit from the new Cadillac
plant by having additional job opportunities.82 Moreover, the Poletown Neighborhood
Council failed to gain the support of Poletown’s African-American residents, many of
whom pointed out that in previous urban re-development projects, Polish-American
residents of other neighborhoods failed to support them and many “knew a good
[economic] deal [on its face] when they saw one.”83
In addition, the short amount of time that accompanies many economic
development takings, such as those in Poletown under Michigan’s quick-take statute,
necessarily dictates that any groups will be largely short-lived. In contrast to large
private interests, including corporations, developers, and other real estate interests that
know there is some degree of permanence in their ventures and therefore form politically
effective interest groups to influence politicians regarding these ventures, homeowners
and small businesspersons faced with an economic development taking have no reason to
form a lasting alliance between themselves or others.84
Not only does the average citizen lack the requisite political power to stop
economic development takings legislation at the state level and the requisite political
power to stop the actual taking at the municipal level, but also there is little practical
recourse to be found in the courts. To mount a lawsuit contesting the eminent domain
taking and perhaps to continue litigation until the exhaustion of all appeals against often
well-financed and organized municipal and perhaps state legal offices, is an undertaking
that most average Americans faced with the prospect of losing their home or small
business simply cannot afford.85 For example, the homeowners in Kelo were able to
mount and continue their judicial attack to the highest levels of the American judicial
system only because they were represented by the Institute of Justice, a non-profit law
firm.86
C. Economic Subsidies
different landowners in close proximity and who are bound to be displaced by the project, thus strengthening the
bonds that would facilitate landowners’ stance as a united group in opposition to the takings).
82
See BRYAN D. JONES & LYNN W. BACHELOR, THE SUSTAINING HAND 155 (1986). But see Gallagher, supra
note 44, at 1868 (discussing that residents in Poletown banded together to form the Poletown Neighborhood
Council to contest the takings and noting that, in Kelo, property owners who opposed the takings organized to
file a lawsuit). It should be noted, however, that there were only 10 Kelo landowners who filed suit, thus
minimizing the effect that the group may have had, given its small numbers, regardless of how tightly organized
it was.
83
Id.; see also Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 471 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (noting that the community-at-large failed to
mobilize behind the Poletown Neighborhood Council because of “[t]he promise of new tax revenues, retention of
a mighty GM manufacturing facility in the heart of Detroit, new opportunities for satellite businesses, retention
of 6,000 or more jobs, and concomitant reduction of unemployment, all fostered a community-wide chorus of
support for the project.”).
84
Mansnerus, supra note 67, at 436.
85
See Jennifer J. Kruckeberg, Note, Can Government Buy Everything?: The Takings Clause and the Erosion of
the “Public Use” Requirement, 87 MINN. L. REV. 543, 573 (2002) (“Private landowners are at a disadvantage
fighting against cities with vast taxpayer revenues to pay good attorneys and to appeal rulings. If a single private
landowner’s property is taken, she may not have the money to challenge the city’s action in court.”).
86
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658.
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Ironically, the average citizen, including those whose homes and small businesses
are taken, ends up paying twice, a sort of double taxation, for the privilege. The first time
he or she “pays” is through the seizure of his or her house and livelihood. The second
time is through tax dollars that often pay to subsidize the economic development behind
which already wealthy corporate interests are the “sustaining hand.” This second level of
“taxation” in economic development takings often comes in the form of tax dollars spent
to purchase the land under eminent domain, bonds or other debt issued that all levels of
government, including local, state, and federal, must service to pay for the purchase of
the land, or certain promises made by the government as part of the economic
development deal. A third level of “taxation” may occur should a rare landowner
expend resources in attorney’s fees and court costs to seek recourse in the judicial
system.
Furthermore, large corporate interests are economically subsidized by not having
to bid on the private, competitive real estate market for the land that is taken and paying
market prices for its acquisition.87 This subsidy, in combination with ones associated
with the second level of taxation above, result in those with the most resources benefiting
economically at the expense of those with the least economic means.
Paradoxically, it is also the more desperate cities that end up paying the most in
subsidies to attract large corporate interests, and the wealthiest corporations that end up
receiving the largest concessions.88 Like a child, therefore, who runs to his parent to
protect him from a fight with a bully, large corporate interests run to the government to
shield them from the economic pain of the open market.
D. History Repeats Itself: Poletown, the Kelo of Its Day
Judge Ryan, one of the dissenting judges in Poletown, wrote tellingly in his 1981
dissenting opinion that “the reverberating clang of its [Poletown’s] economic,
sociological, political, and jurisprudential impact is likely to be heard and felt for
generations.”89 The Poletown clang has now been replaced by the sonic boom of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo, a decision that parallels Poletown almost 25 years
later, but whose effects will ultimately be more far-reaching and likely longer lasting.
In 1981, the Michigan Supreme Court upheld in Poletown, a Michigan “quicktake” statute that authorized municipalities to use eminent domain for economic
development. In practice, this quick-take statute90 allowed the city of Detroit to take
Poletown, a historic neighborhood composed primarily of 3,438 lower-class elderly
87

Kruckeberg, supra note 85, at 579 (2002) (discussing the notion that corporations should be prevented from
having to go “outside of the open market.”).
88
John J. Bukowczyk, The Decline and Fall of a Detroit Neighborhood: Poletown vs. G.M. and the City of
Detroit, 41WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 70 (1984) (quoting Bachelor, supra note 82, at 48) (“ . . . those cities most
in need of increased revenues are likely to make the greatest overpayments, and those corporations with the
greatest profit margins are likely to receive the largest surpluses from them.”).
89
Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 464-65 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
90
The “quick-take” statute allowed for faster takings, “making the process easier for both the condemning
authority and the ultimate owner.” Mansnerus, supra note 67, at 435; see also Rocco C. Nunzio, Note, Eminent
Domain: Private Corporations and the Public Use Limitation, 11 U. BALT. L. REV. 310, 319 & n. 89 (1982),
and Poletown, 304 N.W.2d 455 at 461 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
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residents of Polish descent and African-Americans for the construction of a new $500
million dollar Cadillac plant91 by General Motors (GM). The plant was to cost nearly
$200,000,000 to local, state, and federal taxpayers, and GM and Detroit promised 6150
auto-manufacturing jobs and $15 million in property tax revenues.92
Like the city of New London in Kelo, Detroit made the case that it was in dire
economic straits. One of the dissenting opinions in Poletown noted
[w]hile unemployment is high throughout the nation, it is of
calamitous proportions throughout the state of Michigan,
and particularly in the City of Detroit, whose economic
lifeblood is the now foundering automobile industry. It is
difficult to overstate the magnitude of this crisis.
Unemployment in the state of Michigan is 14.2%. In the
City of Detroit it is at 18%, and among black citizens it is
almost 30%.93
Therefore, unemployment is often the bait to lure judicial approval in economic
development takings.
Moreover, like New London in Kelo, Detroit in Poletown justified the use of
eminent domain for the construction of a new General Motors Cadillac plant by pointing
to its dismal economic statistics.94 Although the kind of economic development pursued
in each case differed, with Kelo having a large-scale mixed commercial/residential
project, and Poletown having the GM manufacturing plant, both cases had similar
intended benefits to the public: the retention of or new jobs, more tax revenue, and spilloff reconstruction into the community. In each instance, however, a small group of
average citizen residents who lacked political and economic influence, were pitted
against City Hall and the large powerful interests standing with them.

91

Bukowczyk, supra note 88, at 61.
Id. at 464 n.15, 467; see also JONES AND BACHELOR, supra note 82, at 138-39,
and JEANIE WYLIE, POLETOWN: COMMUNITY BETRAYED 52 (1989) (noting that the social cost to the Poletown
takings was the clearance of 1,400 homes, 144 businesses, and 16 churches and that estimates the actual cost to
taxpayers was over $300,000,000); see also Somin, supra note 78, at 1017 (analyzing the social and economic
costs to the taking of the Poletown neighborhood and arguing that with the closing of small businesses located in
Poletown as a result of the takings, Detroit actually suffered a net job loss and that the condemnation of the
neighborhood “did the people of Detroit more harm than good”); see also Somin, supra note 78, at 1018
(confirming that $150 million of taxpayer money expended on the Poletown project came from federal loans and
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ITALIAN-AMERICANS 379 (2d ed. The Free Press 1982); see also Bukowczyk, supra note 88, at 62.
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Poletown, 304 N.W. 2d at 465 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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Yet another similarity that Poletown has with Kelo is that the neighborhood did
not suffer from blight, was not a slum, nor did it pose any other hazard to the
community.95 Both neighborhoods, however, did suffer from one commonality--they
happened to be located in areas that large politically-connected corporations, namely
Pfizer Corp. and General Motors, respectively, wanted for their own ends, regardless of
the spill-over benefits to the community.
For instance, in Poletown, Judge Ryan included in his dissenting opinion
correspondence from GM to Mayor Young of the city of Detroit that detailed the extent
to which General Motors’s hand was involved in the destruction of Poletown. According
to the correspondence, GM conceived the project, dictated the site where the Cadillac
plant was to be built and the deadlines by which it was to receive title to all of the land
seized in Poletown, directed how costs involved in clearing the site and making
improvements to it were to be allocated, and demanded 12 years of property tax
abatements.96
More than 20 years later, it appeared that Pfizer and New London had absorbed
the lessons of Poletown, as there was no “smoking gun” correspondence that detailed the
extent to which the parties were intertwined in the taking of the petitioners’ homes in Fort
Trumbull. Nonetheless, it was clear to Justice Thomas that the project, located adjacent
to Pfizer’s $300 million newly-built research complex,97 was “suspiciously agreeable to
the Pfizer Corporation.”98
Indeed, in a review of documents dating from 1997
concerning the project, Pfizer, like GM, was involved from the plan’s inception, and it
detailed a “vision” for the Fort Trumbull area that involved replacing the neighborhood
with upscale housing and office space to mesh with the Pfizer campus.99
More startlingly, is that several former high-ranking state officials confirmed that
Pfizer demanded that Connecticut replace Fort Trumbull or else it would not build the
multi-million dollar Pfizer facility.100 The reason for this demand was that, as one
official noted, Pfizer wanted to ensure that the PhD’s that it wanted to attract to work in
its adjacent research complex and who would be making $150,000 to $200,000 annually,
felt comfortable in the neighborhood and enjoyed a high quality of life.101 The husband
of a former president of the New London Development Corporation, who was a Pfizer
executive, was notably quoted in a Connecticut newspaper as saying that, “Pfizer wants a
nice place to operate. We don’t want to be surrounded by tenements.”102
95

Mansnerus, supra note 67, at 418 (supporting the lack of blight and sub-standard conditions in Poletown); see
also Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674-75 (noting that the Petitioners’ homes in Kelo were “well-maintained” and yielded
no kind of social ill).
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Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 466-71 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659.
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Id. at 2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Id.
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Sidewalk, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 25, 2001, at 5; see also Barry Yeoman, Whose House Is It Anyway?, AARP
Magazine Online, Nov. 3, 2005, http://www.aarpmagazine.org/money/whose _house_is_it_anyway.html. In
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The cost to taxpayers for both Kelo and Poletown has been enormous. In
Poletown, the price tag to local, state, and federal taxpayers was upwards of
$200,000,000.103 The expense to taxpayers has been similar in Kelo, where in addition
to the $118 million in financial incentives that Connecticut and New London offered to
Pfizer to build its facility, the state has spent an additional $73 million from bonds for the
redevelopment of Fort Trumbull.104
In spite of these massive costs to the taxpayer and the “sustaining hand” of GM
and Pfizer, both the Poletown and Kelo majorities justified the takings of the
neighborhoods by pointing to the public benefits to the community that would result from
the economic development projects and supplant the neighborhoods, the GM/Cadillac
plant in the former and the large-scale, mixed-use redevelopment project in the latter. In
neither case, however, did the courts verify or inquire into whether these benefits would
likely take place. In both cases, the public benefits were speculative. Indeed, in the
case of Poletown, the promise made by GM and Detroit was that “at least 6,000 jobs”
were to be created by replacing the neighborhood with a Cadillac plant.105
Reality, however, proved a different matter. The GM plant ended up opening
two years late.106 In 1988, seven years after the condemnations of the neighborhood, “no
more than 2,500 workers”107 worked there. Moreover, in 1998, at the apex of the
economic expansion of the 1990s, only 3,600 workers were employed at the plant, a
figure equivalent to less than 60% of the 6,150 jobs initially promised.108 In addition,
with the closing of small businesses located in Poletown, there is an argument that
Detroit actually suffered a net loss of jobs and that the condemnation of the neighborhood
“did the people of Detroit more harm than good.”109
The current economic health of GM is reason enough why Kelo should be reexamined, and it illustrates the futility of relying on illusory benefits of using economic
development as a pretext to take someone’s home or business. For instance, because of
GM’s decreased market share, which many attribute to the carmaker’s inability “to make
cars that people want to buy,”110 GM announced in November 2005 that it was
eliminating 30,000 jobs and fully and partially closing a dozen plants.111 In addition, GM
lost $8.6 billion in 2005, providing a reason for the termination of 30,000 people.112
GM, however, is not alone in its economic woes. All three of Detroit’s Big Three
automakers, including Ford and Chrysler, have eradicated or have plans to eradicate
S.Ct. at 2669-70. In addition, Justice Kennedy pointed out that even the justices on the Connecticut Supreme
Court that dissented had agreed that the plan was not “to serve the interests of Pfizer . . . or any other private
party.” Id.
103
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104
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105
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111
Micheline Maynard and Vikas Bajaj, Ford to Cut Up to 30,000 Jobs and 14 Plants in Next Six Years, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2006, at A1.
112
Michael Ellis, Ex-GM Spokesman Returns, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 1, 2006, at 6F.

18

86,000 jobs, or one-third of their work force in North America.113 Moreover, Detroit’s
auto industry’s bonds have been “downgraded to junk.”114
Perhaps cognizant of the inherent vagaries of the marketplace and the resultant
instability on which economic development takings rest, the Michigan Supreme Court,
therefore, reversed Poletown in County of Wayne v. Hathcock,115 only a year before the
U.S. Supreme Court seemingly “upheld” the decision in Poletown, almost 25 years later.
Hathcock involved Wayne County’s decision, a county that includes Detroit, to condemn
19 parcels of land, for the construction of Pinnacle Project, a business and technology
park that was anticipated to create 30,000 jobs and yield $350 million in new tax
revenues for the county.116 Wayne County argued that Pinnacle Project would create
jobs, grow the tax base, stem population loss and disinvestment in the community, and
provide fertile ground for additional re-development.117
The Hathcock court
acknowledged that these four public benefits were in harmony with the Michigan statute
under which eminent domain was exercised by the County,118 but ultimately they were
inconsistent with the Michigan Constitutional requirement that eminent domain be
exercised only for a “public use.”119 Like Justice Thomas in Kelo,120 the court further
noted that almost every use of real property by a business or “productive unit” benefits
the community.121 According to the court, to justify the use of economic domain
because a particular profit-seeking private party would put the land to “better use,” in the
form of more money to the public purse and more jobs to the community, eviscerates the
restrictions imposed on eminent domain by the Michigan Constitution.122
Thus far, the economic benefits promised as a result of the condemnations in
Kelo have been just as illusory as those promised in Poletown. The public outcry against
the takings in Kelo has left investors wary of building on land that has become a potent
symbol of eminent domain abuse and left the petitioners in Kelo confident enough to stay
in their houses and even to renovate them.123 Moreover, “contract disputes and financial
uncertainty” have marred plans to construct in previously cleared areas of Fort
113
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Trumbull.124 Indeed, the Mayor of New London has publicly questioned the viability of
the re-development of Fort Trumbull for at least the next two years.125 Therefore, in such
times of economic flux, declines in market share, and investor pull-outs and hesitation,
terra firma was one of the last things upon which homeowners and small business owners
could plant their feet, but under Kelo, however, even the ground is not so firm.
IV. A New Framework
A. Corporate Influence
The Supreme Court’s failure to provide courts with a clear definition of what sort
of “comprehensive, integrated, or balanced” economic development plan would be
constitutional under the Fifth Amendment, combined with its position of extreme
deference to legislatures that over which large corporate interests often exert great
influence, leaves the floodgates wide open for abuse by large private interests that are
often the “sustaining hand” behind many economic development takings. Furthermore,
the Court’s refusal to require evidence from the government that the promised theoretical
public benefits of the taking, whether in the form of increased jobs and tax revenues, will
yield actual equivalent benefits to the community further perpetuates the ability of
corporate entities to enjoy the advantages of their cozy relationships with legislators and
municipal leaders, to the detriment of ordinary citizens.
Abuses of this sort were seen in Poletown and in Kelo,126 but the list, however,
runs long.127 For instance, in 2001, a federal district court in California granted plaintiff
99 Cents’ motion for summary judgment128 after the city of Lancaster, California, had
initiated condemnation proceedings on property in which a 99 Cents Only store had a
leasehold interest.129 Costco Wholesale Corporation (Costco) had previously demanded
that it be allowed to expand its store on the space occupied by 99 Cents.130 Viewing
Costco as an '"anchor tenant”’ and fearful of Costco’s relocation to another city,
Lancaster put forth a proposal to expend $3.8 million of taxpayer money to purchase the
leased property from the owner, relocate 99 Cents at taxpayer expense, and sell the
property to Costco for $1.00, though there was no evidence that the 99 Cents store was
124
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blighted.131 To the court’s credit, it placed the brakes on this economic development
project, tainted as it were by corporate influence.
Another contemporary example of the inordinate corporate influence on takings is
exemplified in Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v. National City
Environmental, L.L.C.132 in which an Illinois court struck down a development
authority’s (SWIDA) exercise of eminent domain on behalf of a private racetrack
operator that needed more parking.133 Conveniently, the racetrack found it cheaper to
petition the government to take an adjacent landowner’s property for ground parking,
instead of building a parking garage on its own property.134 As a result of the
development authority’s action, the racetrack’s revenues were expected to increase to up
to $14 million.135 The court also noted that SWIDA, as an agent of the government,
advertised that, for a fee, it would condemn land “at the request of ‘private developers’
for the ‘private use’ of developers.”136
Yet another case in which courts have acted to counteract the expansive influence
of large corporate interests in economic development takings involved the condemnation
of two small businesses and an elderly woman’s home by the New Jersey Casino
Redevelopment Authority.137 Trump Plaza Hotel & Casino, owned by Donald Trump,
had successfully petitioned the Redevelopment Authority to condemn the landowners’
properties because Trump Plaza needed limousine parking. The New Jersey court held
that the limousine parking was a public use, but that the taking was simply a pretext for
giving Trump a “blank check” to it, including the addition of more casino space, without
oversight by the government.138 Here again, it was the judicial branch that stepped in to
check the imbalance of power in the legislative and executive branches.
A recent case that has been placed on the fast-track post-Kelo and that is currently
attracting significant media attention, is equally illustrative of the vast power that large
corporate interests can have on municipalities and states. The city of Oakland has evicted
two small businesses, Revelli Tire and Autohouse, from land that the businesses own, as
part of a redevelopment of the city.139 This development is expected to cost $61 million
to taxpayers, and it will consist of, in part, a Sears store that would also include a tire
store.140
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B. Creative Solutions
Despite these instances of abuse of ordinary citizens and the implications thereof
in the wake of Kelo, this paper, unlike others however, does not advocate a categorical
ban on economic development.141 If economic development takings were banned, cities
may respond by retaining ownership of seized land, but “contracting it out” via leases to
Ogden, Utah, that was projected to yield $1 million per year in additional sales tax revenue, and would have cost
taxpayers $2.1 million to move residents and to clear the land, but for which landowners complained Ogden was
offering below-market rates and that two Wal-Mart stores were located within a 10-minute drive of the proposed
site. See Lynn Arave, Y’all Come! Ogden Leaders Eager to Get a Wal-Mart, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Nov.
14, 2004, at B-3. Another example of the undue private influence in economic development takings akin to
Poletown and Kelo was found in Mesa, Arizona, in which an Arizona appellate court struck down the
condemnation of two small businesses, as inviolate of the “public use” restriction in the Arizona Constitution,
that were slated for redevelopment after the owner of a neighboring Ace Hardware store, who came from a
prominent family in Mesa, requested that the sites be included in the redevelopment project so that he could
expand his hardware store on the new site, together with a large retail center that would have offered stores,
offices, and eating establishments. Bailey v. Myers, 76 P.3d 898 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003), and Berliner, supra note
127, at 16. In addition, in Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 331-33 (N.Y. 1975), the New
York Court of Appeals affirmed the condemnation of land by the city of Yonkers’ Community Development
Agency that initiated proceedings to transfer land to Otis Elevator Company, a leading employer in Yonkers that
“openly expressed a desire to acquire” it, though Yonkers was to subsidize the acquisition and the City had made
no more than a “bare pleading” that the area in which the land was located was “substandard.” See also Hous.
and Redev. Auth. for Richfield v. Walser Auto Sales, Inc., 630 N.W.2d 662 (Minn. 2001) (affirming the trial
court’s holding to uphold a condemnation order of an auto dealership for a blighted area because of the closeness
of the auto dealerships to residential areas, though the land was to be transferred to Best Buy to build a store).
Moreover, in 2000, the city of New Rochelle, New York, took steps to declare a neighborhood of 34 homes, 160
primarily elderly residents, 29 businesses in which over 400 individuals worked, and two churches, “blighted,”
based on a study paid for by Ikea, in order to make way for an Ikea store that the company had projected to bring
$2.5 million in annual sales tax revenue. Cognizant of New Rochelle’s past unsuccessful ventures with
economic development takings, in which the City cleared downtown land in the 1960’s for a mall that closed in
the early 1990’s but re-packaged ten years later as an “entertainment and retail complex” and in which the City
cleared property around its train station in the late 1980’s for a condominium project that never got off the
ground, residents protested and Ikea later backed out of the deal. See Debra West, Ikea Wants to Move In, but
Neighbors Fight Moving Out, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2000), at B1, and Winnie Hu, Ikea Cancels Plans for Store In
Westchester, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2001, at B1. In a similar project, the city of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, wanted
to take 64 downtown buildings that included “restaurants, flower shops, and a 144-year-old optometry business,”
to be replaced by a $500 million retail project that would have yielded $181,000 more in annually property tax
revenues at a cost of $70 million to taxpayers. Eminent Thievery, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2001, at A26. The
project was halted after Nordstrom, a proposed anchor tenant of the project, chose not to pursue the deal.
Eminent Thievery, at A26. The venerable New York Times has also been the recipient of eminent domain
largesse from the government in the form of the Empire State Development Corporation. David W. Dunlap,
Blight to Some is Home to Others: Concern over Displacement by a New Times Building, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25,
2001, at D1. The development corporation condemned a city block in Times Square for construction of a new
New York Times building, forcing the removal of countless businesses, a dormitory, and hundreds of homes, at a
cost of over $500 million in taxpayer subsidies. Dunlap, at D1.
141
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Kentucky in Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3, 7 (Ky. 1979) (brushing aside economic development
justifications for the use of eminent domain because “[e]very legitimate business, to a greater or lesser extent,
indirectly benefits the public by benefiting the people who constitute the state.”). See also Somin, supra note 78,
at 1009-10.
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powerful private interests for private development. Such arrangements are already
common practices in other contexts, such as when cities or their airport authorities enter
into restaurant leases with private parties in airports, or when they enter into contracts for
private garbage collection services. Also, there may be legitimate instances in which
governments may use eminent domain for the right kind of economic development.
Other scholars have argued that strict scrutiny should be applied to economic
development takings as a way to guard against the exploitation of the average citizen.142
These scholars assert the idea that the taking of a home is more than an ordinary
economic right deserving of only rational basis scrutiny, but one that is a fundamental
right because of the “personal element” in a home.143 They argue that an individual’s
interest in his or her home is one akin to life or liberty under the Due Process Clause.144
Although cognizant of other proposals designed to address the power inequities in
economic development takings between average citizens and large corporate interests,
this paper will advocate a different framework. Not only may there be legitimate
situations in which eminent domain should be used for economic development, but also
the Supreme Court has explicitly affirmed the use of the rational basis test to scrutinize
economic development takings. The Court has, therefore, implicitly rejected a strict
scrutiny test.
From the outset, however, it appears that regardless of the theoretical answers
proposed to address the imbalance of power in these sorts of takings, as a practical matter
there are a number of creative solutions to which the parties themselves, the landowner
and the large corporate interest, without interference by the judicial system could agree.
The advantage of more creative answers is that they may result in a balancing of the
eminent domain scales between the average landowner, who must pay doubly with his
home or small business and for taxpayer subsidies of economic development, and the
government and large corporate interests. On the other hand, these solutions may likely
be more time-consuming, given the need to think creatively instead of linearly, and more
expensive for government, and ultimately for tax-payers, and large corporate interests
with deep pockets. However, these characteristics may serve to force developers and
government to consider carefully all of the ramifications of their plans.
For instance, an obvious resolution is one that would establish a premium price,
above fair market value, for takings of homes.145 This premium would take into account
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the sentimental or personal value of “home,” including one’s neighborhood and
community,146 a value that is often more than the market would assign and that is placed
on the property if the landowner is not a willing seller.147 The premium would also
include reasonable costs of relocation or reasonable attorney’s fees should a legal
challenge be mounted against a taking, and the cost of a similar home in a similarly
situated neighborhood or area.148 For instance, the New York and Indiana Legislatures
are deliberating legislation that would assess this premium at 25% and 50% above market
value, respectively, for economic development takings.149 In addition, some scholars
have proposed that the premium be tied, on a sliding scale, to the length of residence in a
home.150
Small-business owners would be similarly compensated for loss, not only for the
fair market value of their land, but also for the value of their business’ good will, an
amount that would correlate with the number of years the business had occupied the land,
and the costs of relocation and construction of a similar building in a comparable area.151
Still other scholars have suggested that another creative solution, albeit expensive and
likely impractical but in keeping with a truly free market system, would be to have
landowners name their price and to require the state and large corporate interests to
oblige.152
Without resorting to takings, an additional inspired solution to accumulate land
for an economic development project would be to have landowners, whose property is
slated for the development, to share in the profits that it would generate.153 There is
precedent for just such an endeavor when in Atlanta, 39 African-American families were
able to receive shares in the commercial development project that replaced their
neighborhood.154
It should be remembered that countless successful economic development
projects, such as Disney World,155 have been built without resort to eminent domain,
though it is often cited as a necessary tool for redevelopment against individuals who
attempt to “hold out” for the maximum price for their land. However, when it comes to
holdouts, Euclid, Ohio, tried an unusual but fresh approach. When a developer that
It is also important to note that the residents in Poletown received much less than they believed their homes were
worth in the judicial settlement, and they did not receive payment for the cost of replacing their homes.
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wanted to build a marina and a luxury high-rise development on Lake Erie was urging the
city to use eminent domain on remaining holdout landowners, the city was well aware of
the possibility of a public outcry from residents. Therefore, the Mayor and a City
Council member wrote a polite letter to remaining landowners requesting their
cooperation and offering their willingness to meet with landowners in reaching a
“satisfactory resolution.”156 The developer was able to secure almost all of the land that
it needed. Moreover, in exchange for one landowner selling an adjacent rental house and
a vacant lot to the developer, he remained in his house while the development was built
around him.157
In Pittsburgh, instead of resorting to eminent domain on a holdout 50-year-old
pizzeria for the planned redevelopment of an old Sears store into a Home Depot, Home
Depot agreed to house the pizzeria in its parking lot.158 Furthermore, in a similar move in
Huntington Beach, California, after the city voted against using eminent domain to
condemn a mall in favor of private developers, the developers included the discount
retailers, most of whom opposed the initial project, in the Mediterranean-themed
shopping center.159
C. An Alternative Framework for Analyzing the Effect of Economic Development
Takings On the Average Citizen: Social Capital Impact Assessments

Despite the array of creative solutions that can be used to restore the balance of
power in proposed eminent domain takings, the need for a new framework by which
courts examine post-Kelo economic development takings, other than those already
discussed in Part IV.B. is necessary, as the Supreme Court has implicitly rejected these
solutions.160 It is likely that the floodgates of eminent domain abuse may open wide postKelo as a result of the combination of the following several factors: 1) the current
fervor by many “desperate” cities for downtown revitalization, 2) the high degree of
deference expressly accorded the legislature by the Supreme Court regarding economic
development takings, though ordinary citizens have very little influence on the
legislature, in contrast to well-financed politically powerful private interests, 3) the
Supreme Court’s failure in Kelo to define the largely opaque requirement of an
“integrated, balanced, or comprehensive” economic development plan, and 4) the Kelo
156
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Court’s refusal to hold municipalities and states accountable for the public benefits
promised as a result of the economic development, in the face of striking evidence that
the public benefits promised are not always yielded.
In this new framework, it is evident that many economic development
takings largely involve the taking of land owned by generally small groups of average
citizens who are individual homeowners and/or small business owners. Examples of
these takings abound and include the petitioners in Kelo, 99 Cents,161 SWIDA,162 Casino
Redevelopment Authority,163 Bailey v. Myers,164 and Richfield.165 Other examples include
the owner of the Rivelli Tire Store that the city of Oakland wanted to replace with a
Sears,166 the New Rochelle, New York, homeowners who resisted the taking of their land
for an IKEA,167 the Ogden, Utah, residents who opposed the development of a Wal-Mart
on their land,168 and the small business owners and residents displaced by the
construction of a new New York Times building in Manhattan.169
It is logical that these economic development takings would occur, given that the
cost of land in many of these areas is lower, often due to previous neglect by city leaders.
Moreover, in the midst of the popular wave of revitalization, the land has been identified
as valuable, because it is waterfront property, as was the case in Kelo,170 or because large
corporate interests have identified the property as desirable, as evidenced in Poletown,
Kelo, Casino Redevelopment Authority, Bailey, and Richfield, among others.
The
individuals, however, that are impacted by this category of economic development
takings are largely ordinary residents, those who may own their own homes and have
small businesses, but who lack political influence with decision-makers, including
municipal leaders that give the go-ahead to many urban revitalization projects, or state
legislators that promulgate enabling statutes for eminent domain.
Accordingly, given the current environment post-Kelo, an alternative solution
would be one in which courts, or state or federal enabling legislation, would require the
study of the social effects of economic development takings on these average citizens in
the form of a social impact study. Similar purely environmental studies, termed
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Environmental Impact Studies (EIS) and Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA), are
already prescribed in the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.171
1. NEPA-EISs
Some view NEPA as an “environmental constitution”172 because it was
promulgated to ensure environmental harmony and to avert damage to the environment173
by making information available to the public in an effort to compel federal “agencies to
incorporate environmental values into their thinking.”174
The Act requires that all
agencies of the federal government prepare an EIS on all “Federal actions [a project,
regulation, policy, or permit issuance] significantly affecting the quality” of the
environment.175 The EIS is meant to be an “action-forcing mechanism”176 and is a
detailed statement on
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any
adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the
proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local shortterm uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and
enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any
irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it
be implemented.177
In addition, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) has established regulations that
implement NEPA. The regulations mandate that the lead agency preparing the draft EIS
make it available to the public and other agencies “early enough in the decision-making
process for comments to meaningfully affect the agency’s decision,”178 to which the lead
agency must subsequently respond in the final EIS.179 Because of the detail required,
171
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EISs can be costly, ranging from “hundreds of thousands of dollars to several million
dollars.”180 Moreover, in practice, EISs generally take one to two years, if not longer, to
complete.181
Furthermore, the first step in the NEPA inquiry is an Environmental Assessment
(EA) in which the agency will determine if its action will significantly impact the
environment, thus triggering the need for an EIS.182 The public and other agencies are
similarly invited to comment on the EA.183
In contrast to EISs, EAs are usually
approximately 12 pages, and they do not include discussion of alternatives to a project
and to incorporate scant analysis of environmental impact.184 If the agency determines
that there is no significant impact after performing the EA, then it prepares a Finding of
No Significant Impact (FONSI).185
i. Judicial Review
NEPA provides no provisions for judicial review. It has, therefore, been left to
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to review matters arising under NEPA largely
using the APA’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review.186 In certain cases, the
standard of review falls under a “rule of reason.” These matters frequently comprehend
an agency’s decision (1) not to prepare an initial EIS,187 (2) to perform an EIS, but one
that certain interest groups deem is inadequate under NEPA,188 (3) not to compile a
supplemental EIS,189 or (4) to perform an EA, but one that is similarly regarded by
interested parties as insufficient under NEPA.190
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In general, however, “NEPA forces a process but not an outcome.”191 The
process should be “fully informed and well-considered,”192 but ultimately courts are not
able to make decisions on the substantive actions that may be taken, whether or not they
would agree with the agency.193
ii. Assessment of NEPA
The EIS process in NEPA has been roundly criticized for being too burdensome,
costly, and time-consuming.194 Other criticism has centered around NEPA’s heavy
emphasis on process, to the detriment of substance.195 One scholar has noted that “[t]o
this day, the Supreme Court has never decided in favor of a NEPA-plaintiff,” while lower
courts have a more diverse history of rulings favorable to NEPA plaintiffs, but
nonetheless constrained by the focus on process.196
However, Lynton Caldwell, the “intellectual father of EIS” and public
administration professor,197 notes that although “NEPA has not come near to realizing its
full potential,” its success in influencing decision-making regarding environmental policy
should not be underestimated.198 Because of NEPA, federal projects have been
reconsidered, redesigned, or even withdrawn, if the environmental consequences were
simply too severe.199 For instance, projects that would have impacted old-growth forests
or the northern spotted owl have been halted as a result of the EIS process.200
In addition, the public comment and information required in NEPA has given
structure to public debate concerning projects of environmental import that otherwise
would not have occurred without free disclosure.201 Indeed, this scrutiny has empowered
environmental and community groups to participate in the decision-making process, a
process from which they were excluded previously, and has contributed to their increase.
Finally, NEPA has fostered more inter-agency cooperation on plans, and has provided
more information to other potential decision-makers, such as legislators.202 Therefore,
there is an argument that the challenges posed by NEPA are far outweighed by the Act’s
benefits, namely the rise and empowerment of previously excluded environmental and
community groups.
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2. Social Capital Impact Assessments
Within a project that may have significant environmental consequences and thus
triggers an EIS, Sander identifies several socioeconomic factors that may used to form a
Social Capital Impact Statement (SCIS).203 This paper, however, proposes that many of
Sander’s factors, as well as others identified below, could similarly be required in three
possible ways with respect to economic development takings in a Social Capital Impact
Assessment (SCIA). First, courts, likely the Supreme Court, could mandate that SCIAs
be performed and examined, in conjunction with an economic development plan, to
ensure that the necessary consequences and alternatives are considered before embarking
upon a potentially disastrous project. Second, states could require, as part of their
enabling legislation for economic development takings, that SCIAs be executed at an
early enough time in a development proposal’s history to allow for meaningful public
comment on a project. Presumably, this year is a perfect time for states’ considerations
of this proposal, given the legislative reaction of 39 states to Kelo on the issue of takings
for economic development.204 Third, SCIAs could be placed into not only any federal
legislation contemplating restrictions on economic development takings,205 but also into
federal enabling legislation for such takings that are applicable to Washington, D.C, as
was at issue in Berman.206

i. Components of a SCIA
SCIAs for economic development takings would likely include, at a minimum, a
response to the following questions, with studies or data to support the answers. Many of
the following address the concerns outlined in Part III of this paper:
1.
How will the taking or development project disrupt
existing land uses?;
2.
How will the taking or development affect
neighborhood integrity?;
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3.
Will the taking or revitalization project displace and
relocate homes, families, and businesses?;
4.
What opposition, if any, exists to the taking or
project?;
5.
If neighborhood integrity is to be affected or the
taking or revitalization project is to displace homes,
families, and businesses, how can these effects be
mitigated?;
6.
If displacement and relocation identified in
Question Three occur, how many homes, families, and
businesses will be relocated?;
7.
If displacement and relocation occur, how many
opportunities will there be for displaced residents to occupy
space in the new development as a home or as a small
business?;207
8.
If there is no plan to have displaced residents
occupy space in the new development as a home or as a
small business, what proposals do the relevant government
entities have to relocate residents or small business owners
to an equivalent site?;
9.
What is the economic impact of the displacement of
these homes, families, and businesses on the city and
state’s purse, in the form of lost real property and sales
taxes, jobs generated by small businesses that may be
displaced, and revenues generated by these businesses?;
10.
What is the ethnic and racial breakdown of the
families who may be displaced?;
11.
What is the promised economic impact of the
takings, in terms of employment opportunities and tax
revenue gained?;
12.
Is the promised economic impact referred to in
Question Eleven realistic and practical, in light of other
potentially uncontrollable factors, such as the availability of
financing for the project, key tenants and institutions that
207
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may occupy the project, or the economic health of these
key tenants?;
13.
What ties, if any, do the private entities that stand to
gain from the economic development project have with any
state or local governments exercising eminent domain or
promulgating legislation in support of its exercise?; and
14.
What alternatives exist to placing the economic
development project in the proposed site?

ii. The SCIA Process
Just as with EISs in NEPA, SCIAs would incorporate pre-draft and draft versions,
both to which the public and other decision-makers could respond. They would also
include final versions in which the entity seeking to use an economic development taking
would respond to public comments. In addition, provisions for supplemental SCIAs
should be included, in case the initial assessment is inadequate. Moreover, because of the
fractured nature that eminent domain can take, especially with respect to economic
development, it would likely be wise to incorporate public hearings as well as public
comments at each stage of the process in order to allow meaningful input. Furthermore,
it is important to set a reasonable page limit on the SCIAs and ensure that the document
is written in plain English in order for the public to understand it. The fourteen questions,
however, in Part IV.C.2.i. above could be further expanded and standards added to ensure
a consistent process.
Because of the need for this type of information, this paper advocates that SCIAs
should be mandated by the courts or by the legislatures for all economic development
takings. On the other hand, there is the further argument that a mandatory process would
only serve to increase bureaucratic red tape, engender resistance, and perhaps waste time
and resources for economic development takings that might not have a significant
impact.208
Standards for judicial review would depend on the goals of SCIAs. Is the goal to
ensure a process so that the public will have access to information and government and
large corporate interests will have considered all relevant issues in an economic
development project? Or, is the goal to ensure a particular outcome? Because courts
have been reluctant to intervene substantively in NEPA cases, and as evidenced in Kelo
are even more hesitant to interfere in the legislative decision-making in economic
development takings, this paper advocates that SCIAs focus on procedure. This
procedural concentration would encourage the availability of more information and
would foment meaningful participation of previously excluded groups.
Therefore, if the goal is to ensure a process by which the public, government, and
private beneficiaries of economic development takings will be more informed, then the
208
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applicable standard of review could be that already used in assessing NEPA cases. For
instance, to assess the adequacy of a government’s SCIA, the “rule of reason” should be
used.209 On the other hand, the judicial standard of review for a case in which it is argued
that a supplemental SCIA is necessary would invoke an “arbitrary and capricious”
standard.210
iii. Assessment of SCIAs
SCIAs would likely inject more time, expense, and work for the parties involved
and the courts that are charged with reviewing them. However, given the checkered
history of economic development takings and their failure to deliver the public benefits
that were promised, as in Poletown and Kelo, the investment in a SCIA may be
miniscule, especially when compared to the investment of taxpayer dollars that are used
to support a project and the unnecessary bad will that is engendered. By virtue of the
time, expense, and public disclosure, SCIAs would provide incentives for government
and private party decision-makers to consider thoughtfully and carefully the ramifications
and consequences of their plans.
In addition, more information would be provided to the public, and average citizens
would have more of an opportunity to participate and to influence economic development
projects that call for the use of eminent domain. The assessments would likely empower
ordinary citizens, as NEPA has similarly empowered environmental groups. Finally,
SCIAs and the public scrutiny to which they would be subject would likely correct for the
lack of political power and influence that average citizens do not have, especially when
measured against that wielded by large corporate interests.
D. Studies Performed in Kelo
In Kelo, two studies were performed. One focused on the pure economic impact
of the Fort Trumbull redevelopment project on the city of New London and New London
County, a study that was commissioned by the New London Development
Corporation.211 The second study212 was performed pursuant to the Connecticut
Environmental Policy Act,213 and it required an Environmental Impact Evaluation
(EIE)214 or a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) to be performed and submitted to
and approved by the Connecticut Office of Policy Management.215
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Because of the Fort Trumbull project’s impact on homes, Connecticut law also
required that the EIE in Kelo examine the indirect and direct effects on housing, based on
race and income levels of the residents in Fort Trumbull, as well as whether the impact
on housing was consistent with the state’s long-term housing initiative.216
The
Connecticut Office of Policy Management concluded that the economic development
project did not conflict with the state’s housing goals.217
Connecticut’s inclusion of these social factors in the EIE, such as the project’s
impact on housing categorized by race and income levels, is to be commended. The
inclusion of these social factors responds to Questions Three, Six, and Ten in the
alternative framework of SCIAs. Nonetheless, in comparison to the proposed alternative
framework, the law does not delve into the deeper details of economic development
projects, such as the influence that a private interest may have on it, any opposition that
may be percolating against a project, and whether theoretical public benefits may mesh
with what the public will actually receive.218
V. Conclusion
The current explosion in urban redevelopment in many cities, as well as cities’
increasingly “desperate” measures to revitalize not only their downtowns, but also their
bottom-lines through increased tax revenue, has created a situation of economic
development takings that is ripe for abuse post-Kelo. The lack of safeguards placed by
the Supreme Court in Kelo, in the form of extreme deference to the legislature, a refusal
to, parking, water supply, wastewater treatment and the square footage of the facility; (2) the environmental
consequences of the proposed action, including cumulative, direct and indirect effects which might result during
and subsequent to the proposed action; (3) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided and
irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources should the proposal be implemented; (4) alternatives to
the proposed action, including the alternative of not proceeding with the proposed action and, in the case of a
proposed facility, a list of all the sites controlled by or reasonably available to the sponsoring agency that would
meet the stated purpose of such facility; (5) an evaluation of the proposed action's consistency and each
alternative's consistency with the state plan of conservation and development, an evaluation of each alternative
including, to the extent practicable, whether it avoids, minimizes or mitigates environmental impacts, and, where
appropriate, a description of detailed mitigation measures proposed to minimize environmental impacts,
including, but not limited to, where appropriate, a site plan; (6) an analysis of the short term and long term
economic, social and environmental costs and benefits of the proposed action; (7) the effect of the proposed
action on the use and conservation of energy resources; and (8) a description of the effects of the proposed action
on sacred sites or archaeological sites of state or national importance. In the case of an action which affects
existing housing, the evaluation shall also contain a detailed statement analyzing (A) housing consequences of
the proposed action, including direct and indirect effects which might result during and subsequent to the
proposed action by income group as defined in section 8-37aa and by race, and (B) the consistency of the
housing consequences with the long-range state housing plan adopted under section 8-37t.” CONN. GEN. STAT.
§22a-1b(7)(c) (2005).
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to hold cities and large corporate interests accountable for public benefits promised, but
seldom yielded, and the “sustaining hand” of many large private interests in economic
development takings, is frightening to the average citizen faced with the threat of his or
her home or small business being taken by eminent domain. Given these factors, it is
important that these takings be examined under an alternative framework.
Social Capital Impact Assessments that are either mandated by the legislatures in
enabling legislation or by the courts may allow average citizens to bridge the power
inequities between them and the cities, states, and powerful private interests often behind
eminent domain. By providing the public with greater access to information at an early
stage of an economic development project, greater choices will be provided to the public.
As NEPA has proven, the average citizen will be empowered to exert influence over
economic development projects in order to change or even to stop them entirely.
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